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1. INTRODUCTION 
To assess the economic role that China plays in Africa and, starting out, 
to derive the existence of a long-term strategy, we can look at the amount of aid 
it sends to African countries. We can also examine the importance of its com-
mercial exchanges or consider the weight of its direct investments. Chinese 
Government’s aid policy has unquestionably provided a distinctive advantage to 
some Chinese enterprises for it might have allowed them to outbid their com-
petitors and/or to increase their export markets in African countries. This policy 
discloses a strategy which is certainly a political (specifically aid to countries 
with a GNI per capita higher than China) but not necessarily an economic strat-
egy insofar as Chinese economic actors might implement their own medium 
and long term entrepreneurial and financial strategy. Furthermore, the lack of 
transparency in the allocation of the Chinese aid (particularly aid by the Minis-
try of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Defence might be overlooked) makes it hard 
to assess its effective significance. The recent publication in 2011 of Chinese 
official figures on China’s foreign aid is undoubtedly a step towards better un-
derstanding. However, these figures cannot be directly compared with those 
reported as official development assistance by other major donors for defini-
tions and calculations diverge greatly (Defraigne and Belligoli, 2010:11-23; 
World Bank, 2012:440-444). 
 When it comes to merchandise exports and imports, the statistical situa-
tion is quite different as China has long been publishing many statistical trade 
data – even if its classification is not fully identical to the international trade 
classification standards (GAC, 2010). Here the question lies in the potential 
fickleness of commercial relations. The volatility of trade policies and trades 
flows has often been played down in the literature (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 
2008). China, as others countries, tries to reduce its vulnerability to trade shocks 
and to increases the number of its suppliers whenever possible. To secure its 
future crude oil supply, China recently had to significantly reduce its crude oil 
purchases from Iran. On 28 June 2012, Obama’s administration responded to 
this decision by granting China an exemption from U.S. sanctions. Hence, Si-
nopec preserves all its chances of expanding in the United States where it has 
already signed a deal to invest in shale assets (Downs, 2012). The presence of 
the Chinese automakers in Algeria tells a story of the same sort for their activi-
ties mainly go through imports of Chinese vehicles whilst investments are lim-
ited to the opening of commercial bureaux despite initial plans to install assem-
bly lines (El Watan, 2008 and 2012). Chinese vehicles’ exports to Algeria point 
out China’s incapacity to secure a medium or long term investment its enter-
prises would have otherwise favoured. 
Hence, in this paper I shall hold to the investment approach because, con-
trary to the first two, direct investment forcefully implies an entrepreneurial 
commitment upon the medium and/or long term in the economy of a country. 
According to the definition proffered by international authorities like the 
OECD: Foreign direct investment (FDI) “…is an activity in which an investor 
resident in one country obtains a lasting interest in, and a significant influence 
on the management of, an entity resident in another country. This may involve 
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either creating an entirely new enterprise (so-called "greenfield" investment) or, 
more typically, changing the ownership of existing enterprises (via mergers and 
acquisitions). Other types of financial transactions between related enterprises, 
like reinvesting the earnings of the FDI enterprise or other capital transfers, are 
also defined as foreign direct investment.”(OECD, 2003:158, box VI-I).  
The purpose of this paper is consequently to review available statistical 
and informational databases in order to understand the actual importance of 
Chinese direct investment in Africa and to infer its strategic significance. In the 
Western press and academia, Chinese presence in Africa is most often labelled 
in normative terms to compare and contrast the role of Chinese and Western 
involvement in Africa. Thence, in French for example, the phrase Chinafrique 
was coined to emulate that of Françafrique (Michel and Beuret, 2008). Such 
analyses regularly stress the supervision that the Chinese government exerts 
over Chinese enterprises (Foster et al., 2008; Buckley et al., 2007). In one re-
spect, the Chinese government is regarded as having a particular responsibility 
in the way Chinese enterprises are behaving abroad since host countries consid-
er that FDI must be operated according to fair and transparent governance and 
should contribute to their economic and social development – two contending 
views of China’s role are argued for instance by Peter Brookes (2007:5) and 
Deborah Brautigam (2009:188). In another respect, the Chinese government 
arouses suspicion because China is a communist country; its enterprises are 
consistently suspected to be its visible hand, hence to pursue purposes beyond 
their regular commercial activities and to benefit from all sorts of undue ad-
vantages (inter alia see Morck et al., 2008).  
I shall successively present three main data and information sources, then 
summarize some observations they allow, and finally question the role and 
strategies of those Chinese enterprises investing in Africa which are under the 
direct supervision of the Chinese government.  
2. DATA AND INFORMATION SOURCES 
Chinese outward direct investment (hereafter ODI) is a rather new phe-
nomenon which actually began in the early 2000s with the effective implemen-
tation of the “going out” 1 policy. There is some uncertainty about the precise 
date when this strategy was adopted. It is patent that such an extrovert and pro-
active policy was launched by Jiang Zemin in July 1996 on his return from his 
journey to six African countries. The use of the term itself could however date 
no earlier than 24 December 1997 when he delivered a speech at the National 
Foreign Investment Work Conference. As for the official launch, it could have 
taken place at the 21st Century Forum held in Beijing in June 2000 (Chen, 
2009b). Consequently, the systematic collection of investment data did not 
begin before 2003 (see infra). As a result, the scarcity of statistical figures com-
bined with their limited disclosure have obviously contributed to foster qualita-
                                                     
1
 This is the exact meaning of the Chinese formula (zouchuqu); the ponderous translation "going 
global" makes it unnecessarily emphatic.  
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tive analyses when not normative. It is only with the publication in 2010 of the 
2009 Statistical Communiqué of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(Duiwai zhijie touzi tongji gongbao – subsequent references to these statistical 
communiqués will be noted Communiqué followed by the year of reference.) 
that begins a wider diffusion of statistical data about Chinese outward invest-
ment which culminated in September 2012 with the commercial diffusion of 
these data. To state it simply, it was quite impossible to undertake quantitative 
analyses until very recently. So it is very unlikely that the empirical material 
available to the researcher could nourish any sensible mathematical formalisa-
tion, as a result “econometric analyses of the factors that drive China’s ODI in 
Africa are lacking” (Cheung et al., 2011:2). Studies on China’s ODI in Africa 
could not but be policy-oriented or descriptive in nature.2 For all these reasons it 
is imperative to begin by introducing the major sources of statistics and infor-
mation about Chinese ODI so to stress the uniqueness of the Chinese ones 
which will be preferably used in this paper.  
2.1. The UNCTAD on-line database 
The UNCTAD on-line database3 is free, public, and bilingual (French and 
English). The statistical data it gives are absolute values (total or per capita 
volume measured in US dollars at current prices and current exchange rates) or 
relative values (as a percentage of GDP or of Gross Fixed Capital Formation). 
There are data by country for a period beginning in the 1970s (when available) 
up to today – 2010 when writing these lines. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows and stock are computed for both inward FDI and outward FDI. 4 
The usage of this database has two major impairments. Firstly, it is im-
possible to cross-tabulate data to set up subpopulations (China-France, China-
Ghana or Chinese investment by sector… for example) and therefore to ap-
praise flows and stock of FDI between two countries or in various sectors of a 
specific country. Secondly, there are no sectoral indicators available to verify 
whether China has a specific investment strategy towards for example African 
countries. In other words, this database permits us only to proclaim that Country 
X has made greater or lesser of something than Country Y.  
To further underline the statistical difficulties, I will recall here the re-
marks set forth by UNCTAD within its Economic Development in Africa Re-
port 2010 – South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Develop-
ment Partnership (UNCTAD, 2010:80). “The first limitation is that many de-
veloping countries do not report outward FDI data. While for some of those 
countries their FDI outflows can be estimated on the basis of information pro-
                                                     
2
 A partial list of such recent studies could include Cheung (2011, 2012), Christensen (2010), 
Corkin (2011, 2012), Dzaka (2012), Li (2011), Li and Guo (2009), Pairault (2010a, 2012), Pang 
(2012), Peng (2011), Song and Zhang (2010)… 
3
 At unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx. 
4
 By convention, foreign direct investment is designated by the acronym FDI which does not 
allow a clear-cut distinction between inward investment (that which benefits a country) and out-
ward investment (that which is made by a country). In this paper outward FDI will be referred to 
as ODI. 
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vided by the recipient countries, it cannot be avoided that total FDI from devel-
oping countries is still underestimated as it covers only those host countries that 
report inward FDI by origin”. Another source of errors in our evaluation resides 
in the practices of enterprises themselves. Undoubtedly one major part of FDI 
outflows emanating from developing countries is going to financial, judicial, 
and banking havens with the intention of reinvesting it in the originating econ-
omy for financial reasons. The case of China is emblematic from this point of 
view since certain authors have been able to estimate that 60% of foreign in-
vestments flowing into China might result from a “round-tripping” phenomenon 
(Pairault, 2010b:123-124). There is a double overestimation here. On one hand 
FDI is counted as an investment, which it is not, on the other, this investment is 
counted twice: once as an outward investment when leaving its home country 
and again when back home as an inward investment! There are also questions 
relating to the nationality of an investment: does an investment has the national-
ity of the place from which the funds originate (The Virgin Islands, for exam-
ple, are often a haven for Chinese funds that are reinvested in China) or that of 
the place where a company is incorporated (e.g. a Chinese-funded company 
incorporated in Delaware) or again by the nationality of the actual owner of the 
capital (a Chinese national who invests in an African company the savings he 
made while being a wage earner in this African country)… all contribute to 
cloud the assessment of an already elusive phenomenon.  
2.2. MOFCOM Annual Communiqués 
In China, the annual publication of official communiqués on Chinese 
ODI only began in 2003. It was a fourteen-page report in Chinese that must be 
tracked down on the website of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM).  In the introduction, it is recalled that this publication is the result 
of a decision that the predecessor to MOFCOM5 took on 30 December 2002 in 
agreement with the National Bureau of Statistics (Communiqué, 2003:1). The 
terms of this decision reflected the definitions proposed by the IMF and OECD 
for building statistical data in the field of FDI. In 2003, a vast inventory of the 
data scattered in various governmental agencies was undertaken. When this 
paper was written, nine communiqués have therefore been published since this 
decision. 
MOFCOM distinguishes between “Financial outward FDI” (jinrong lei 
duiwai zhijie touzi) and “Non-financial outward FDI” (fei jinrong lei duiwai 
zhijie touzi). As financial FDI – not to be confused with portfolio investments 
(duiwai zhengjuan touzi) – was not formerly composed as a separate category, 
no specific computation of financial FDI was done before 2006. The data avail-
able for 2010 indicates that financial FDI represents about to 12.5% of Chinese 
FDI flows of which about 80% is investment in the banking sector, the rest be-
ing investment in insurance companies, brokerage houses as well as other fi-
nancial activities (Communiqué, 2010:2-4).  
                                                     
5
 The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Cooperation or MOFTEC. 
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These reports appraise flows and stock of Chinese ODI in current dollars. 
The reliability of these figures is in part limited because the Chinese capacity to 
observe FDI is itself restrained. Firstly, the system retains only certain forms of 
investment, in particular, the initial investment of the funds themselves while 
neglecting other forms such as the reinvestment of profits… Next, cumbersome 
procedures for obtaining authorization to invest abroad might have encouraged 
many private enterprises (and public ones) to sidestep all contact with supervi-
sory authorities which are the MOFCOM, the National Development and Re-
form commission (NDRC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). 6  From this point of view, the series of regulations adopted by 
MOFCOM in May 2009 and by SAFE in July 2009 should significantly relax 
conditions for investing abroad and, in the future, allow more accurate capture 
of FDI data since enterprises would be less subject to oppressive regulation. 
Finally Chinese authorities might be extremely dependent on information sup-
plied by foreign partners in order to appraise their own ODI. 
The major drawback of these annual communiqués is that the data they 
provided do not enable any cross-comparisons nor they foster any shrewd as-
sessment of the sectoral destination of these ODI. Basically, the statistical tables 
that must be transmitted regularly by Chinese companies investing abroad are 
mainly fiscal ones as revealed by a document promulgated in 2008 and entitled 
Foreign Direct Investment Statistical System; this document published on 31 
December 2008 under number Shanghefa [2008] 529 is a continuation of a pre-
vious document (MOFCOM, 2009). Clearly, the desire to control national eco-
nomic agents still prevails on the resolution to implement the “going out” strat-
egy. Despite its limitations, this database proved to be useful for sporadic econ-
ometric formalisations (Cheung et al., 2011) as well as descriptive studies 
(Pairault, 2010a, 2012). 
2.3. The on-line database of MOFCOM 
The nature of the information here is totally different in that it is unpro-
cessed raw information relating, not to the amount of investment, but to invest-
ment projects. It is therefore not exactly a list of names of Chinese firms invest-
ing abroad (official designation of the database)7 but a list of projects that have 
been authorized and properly recorded, since a company can have several pro-
jects at the same time but recorded at different times. Each form records the 
following information: 
 The registration certificate number issued by MOFCOM  The country of destination  The name of the Chinese enterprise investing abroad  The name of the company benefiting from the investment  The province of origin of the Chinese enterprise investing abroad  The description and purpose of the investment 
                                                     
6
 Correspondence with Liu Shiguo (February 2010); see also OECD (2008: 71). 
7
 Jingwai touzi qiye (jigou) minglu: full translation of the title is “name list of enterprises (institu-
tions) investing abroad”; wszw.hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/FeCp/emf/corp/fem_cert_stat_view _list.jsp. 
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 The date of approval of the investment 
Several limitations of this database can be noted from the outset. First it 
registers only those projects that are actually under the supervision of 
MOFCOM (hence excluding financial projects); it also leaves aside many pro-
jects of investment since the administrative authorities are not able to control 
the origin and destination of all funds used. Second, it identifies projects when 
launched but cannot capture changes (profit reinvestment, reallocation of assets 
already invested abroad...). Despite these drawbacks this database is still valua-
ble to assess the major trends in Chinese ODI and especially since it allows 
some cross-tabulations. In late June 2012, there were nearly 21,700 forms – all 
written in Chinese needless to say.  
In this paper, I will use the three statistical and informational sources 
listed above; however I will focus upon data available from MOFCOM chiefly 
for two reasons. First, they are tools devised for the Chinese policy-makers 
mostly disregarded by Western analysts; second, they are more detailed than 
those data disclosed by UNCTAD for international comparisons. As a result I 
will concentrate my research on information relating to the period of 2003 to 
2012 (all the better since ODI statistics prior to 2003 should arouse suspicion) 
so to assess the role of large publicly-funded groups under the direct supervi-
sion of the central government (i.e. “central enterprises” or zhongyang qiye) 
which are the main originators of Chinese ODI. 
3. CHINESE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA 
In this section I will discuss Chinese ODI primarily in terms of its value 
as reported by MOFCOM and by the on-line database of UNCTAD. 
3.1. The importance of Chinese ODI 
Figure 1. ODI (1982-2010) 
 
                 Source :UNCTAD on-line database  
266 Thierry Pairault 
The statistics computed by UNCTAD give the evolution of ODI (see 
Figure 1). According to this database, the Chinese ODI flows would have 
amounted in 2010 to $ 68 billion which actually represents 5.1% of the total 
flows of FDI worldwide. The relative share of China in the annual flow of the 
world FDI has almost increased fivefold between 2007 and 2010 partly because 
of China’s own dynamic, partly because of a sluggish global economy: total 
world FDI fell by more than 40% between these two years. 
Figure 2. Chinese ODI (2003-2010) 
 
                    Source : MOFCOM Communiqués 
Efforts made by China since the late 1990s for its enterprises and banks 
to "go out" and invest abroad has not therefore been hampered by the current 
global financial crisis as was the case for developed economies – in particular 
for the United Kingdom (-96.0%), Spain (-84.2%), Italy (-76.9%) or Luxem-
bourg (-75.1%) from 2007 to 2010. As the official launching of the current pol-
icy seems to date back to 2000 (see supra), it comes as no surprise that the re-
sults of this policy could not be felt immediately. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the 
take-off occurred in 2004. However, regarding the Chinese ODI towards Africa, 
commitment came slightly later and its effects are much more apparent from 
2006. In 2008 Chinese ODI towards Africa made a considerable leap of almost 
135% over 2007. This jump resulted from an investment by the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which had transferred $ 5.5 billion in ex-
change for a substantial acquisition of shares in the Standard Bank of South 
Africa (Standard Bank, 2012).  
To fully appraise the importance of Chinese ODI, I shall consider the 
countries benefiting from the flows and stock of Chinese ODI as stated by the 
data collected in the statistical communiqué issued by the MOFCOM in 2010 
(Communiqué 2010:10 and 36ff.). The Chinese vulgate opposes Asia – the 
overwhelming beneficiary of Chinese FDI flows (65.3% in 2010) – to other 
destinations which in fact appear as secondary targets (representative of this 
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trend is, inter alia, the 2010 paper by Song Yonghui and Zhang Lei). The mes-
sage is clear: China does not insinuate itself into the backyard of other powers 
and would limit itself to its “natural” influence area, that is, Asia. Such a state-
ment conceals a more complex situation. Given the still rather small amount of 
Chinese ODI, the place taken by Hong Kong (63.0% and 60.6% respectively in 
2009 and 2010) deserves special attention. It has to be pointed out that the role 
of this territory – now a “special administrative region” of China – is primarily 
that of a tax haven which favour the above mentioned phenomenon of round-
tripping (see box below). Hong Kong cannot therefore be merely considered as 
an ordinary Asian destination for Chinese ODI. Hence the approach of Chinese 
ODI must be radically revised to oppose any country or territory generally clas-
sified as financial, judicial or fiscal havens to countries and territories beyond 
this classification. 
3.2. Transparency and destination of Chinese ODI  
The lists of havens published by the OECD on 2 April 2009 at the Sum-
mit of the G20 in London have avoided mentioning Hong Kong and Macao; 
obviously an agreement was struck with China after some political horse-
trading (OECD, 2009). Whatever the price paid, it remains that the statistical 
communiqué date 2005 had explicitly recognized that Hong Kong was acting as 
a tax haven (bishuidi) along with several other destinations (British Virgin Is-
Outward direct investment and round-tripping 
It is obvious that the Chinese government has encouraged inward foreign 
direct investment to foster the reform of the Chinese public sector as evidenced 
by a series of directives and regulations beginning with the Provisional Rules on 
Restructuring SOEs with Foreign Funds (14 September 1998) whose title is self-
explanatory. Also significant is the promulgation on 8 November 2001 of Rec-
ommendations related to Foreign Capital for Listed Companies that allow the 
sale of “shells companies”. It is also acknowledged that China’s public enterpris-
es are operating with a much greater corporate indebtedness than foreign-funded 
enterprises, particularly a long-term debt on average almost double. Under such 
conditions, it is understandable that the temptation is strong to make a “round 
trip” across borders to compete on equal terms with their foreign competitors 
operating in China. Today, privately-funded enterprises might be tempted in turn 
to “go out” as they are encouraged by the Chinese government but less aiming at 
investing abroad than aiming at investing in China under the disguise of a for-
eign company as did their sister companies in the public sector. Hence the role 
that has been played and still is played by Hong Kong and other tax havens. It is 
very difficult to assess the exact impact and the scale of such a corporate strate-
gy. It is well-known that the Chinese government had to enact in 2002 some 
Provisional Rules on using Foreign Investment to Reform SOEs which de-
nounced the warped part often played by foreign capital and which enacted rules 
aiming at stopping inflows of “false foreign capital” (jia waizi). It is therefore 
extremely difficult to distinguish Chinese funds which are genuinely invested in 
Hong Kong from those which are just passing through. 
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lands, Cayman Islands ...), havens towards which would have flowed 81% of 
China's ODI in 2005 (Communiqué, 2005:8). For 2010, it is possible to calcu-
late that the stock of such haven-bound ODI represents 80.3% of the whole 
stock of Chinese ODI and that of non-haven-bound ODI only 19.7% (see Figure 
3 and Table 1).  
Figure 3. Chinese stock of ODI (2010) 
 
                         Source: Communiqué 2010 (author’s calculations) 
Table 1. Chinese stock of ODI (2010) 
 
             Source: Communiqué 2010 (author’s calculations) 
As a result, the stock of Chinese ODI to Africa, which represents only 
about 0.06% of the whole stock of FDI worldwide and 4.1% of the Chinese 
stock of ODI, would amount to 20.7% of the stock of Chinese non-haven-bound 
ODI, that is to say a level almost comparable to that of Asia without Hong 
Kong and other Asian havens (27.6%), twice that of North America (11.9%) 
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and European Union (10.7%). The whole situation suggests that Chinese inves-
tors would lead more readily their businesses in less developed countries than in 
more developed, probably partly because the techniques they are expected to 
implement in the former are generally less sophisticated than those required by 
the second. 
3.3. The “top 14” African countries 
With respect to Africa, China does not have a policy essentially different 
from that of many investing countries. The main destinations of these invest-
ments are identical (South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan, Zambia, Angola). 
These countries, because they have huge reserves of raw materials, are the first 
recipients of self-interested generosity from all investors world-wide; therefore 
the participation rate in 2009 of total FDI flows to gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) can be considerable for some of them (200.8% for Angola, 84.9% for 
Congo, 53.7% for Equatorial Guinea, 51.9% for Nigeria...) as calculated by 
UNCTAD. For others, however, it remains very low (1.4% for Gabon, 5.8% for 
Algeria, 8.4% for South Africa…).8 
Figure 4. The “top 14” African countries  
(90% of accumulated flows of Chinese ODI 
 Sources: Communiqué 2009 and Communiqué 2010 (author’s calculations). Countries 
are ranked according to the sum of net investment flows during each period. The sum of 
successive inflows is not comparable to the stock at a given time which must take into ac-
count reverse movements and revaluations. 
                                                     
8
 Rates above 100% indicate that most often inward investment have not resulted in gross fixed 
capital formation which is a concept different from that investment in that it includes financial 
assets, stocks, certain costs... 
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As regard Chinese investment from 2003 to 2010, 90% of Chinese direct 
investment flows in Africa are benefiting to fourteen African countries. The top 
five recipients got 75% of Chinese ODI flows in Africa, among them South 
Africa alone received 50% of the cumulative flows between 2003 and 2010. But 
what strikes even more is a certain volatility of Chinese investment (see Figure 
4). When asked which country would benefit most from Chinese largesse, the 
answer usually issued almost automatically is “Sudan” because the latter coun-
try, which benefited in 2004 from an important Chinese investment in a contro-
versial political context, became something of an emblem which therefore is 
supposed to vindicate the opposition of some for the Chinese presence in Afri-
ca. China conversely might even have been a kind of a “victim” of competition 
because Sudan does not seem to have suffered from the situation for it remained 
one of the first destinations of global FDI in Africa. The versatility of Chinese 
investment is clearly apparent when comparing the two graphs in Figure 4: 
South Africa takes the top spot in 2008 and acquired a considerable lead over 
other African countries. Not only did this former ally of Taiwan receive in 2008 
almost 90% Chinese FDI flows in Africa (further to the acquisition of holdings 
in Standard Bank of South Africa) but also accumulated in late 2010 alone 
31.8% of the stock of Chinese investment in Africa, while Sudan had to settle 
for 4.7%. Shortly before, in 2004, Sudan enjoyed 19.1% of the stock of Chinese 
ODI in Africa while South Africa benefited only 7.0%. We can see such chang-
es in “status” in all major African partners of China. 
Chinese investment volatility can probably help us better appraise the na-
ture of Chinese involvement in Africa. Regularity and importance of investment 
flows earmarked for one country should express the strategic interest of China 
for this country as much as they would ensure the support of that country to the 
action of China both in Africa and around the world (Gadzala and Hanush, 
2010). But clearly, the choice of the Chinese authorities appears to have been 
more complex than the current preference for South Africa might suggest. 
South Africa – a country that depends little on FDI for its fixed capital for-
mation (see above) – should not feel bound whatsoever to China for that mo-
tive, thus it has little reason to feel politically liable towards China. 
The MOFCOM statement for the year 2008 stresses that the investment 
destination of South Africa has mainly been achieved in the banking industry 
without being more precise (Communiqué, 2008:6). On 25 October 2007, the 
Standard Bank of South Africa announced the establishment of a partnership 
with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). On 3 December 
2007, 95% of the shareholders of Standard Bank approved the acquisition by 
ICBC of a 20% stake in the group. On 3 March 2008, the agreement was final-
ised by the transfer of $5.5 billion in exchange for the acquisition of shares by 
ICBC (Standard Bank, 2012). It would be a total of 65 projects that would be 
covered by this partnership that would promote investment in power plants 
(Morupule B Power Station in Botswana) as in the acquisition of mines in diffi-
culty, including copper and cobalt mines in the D.R. Congo and Zambia (China 
Daily, 2009; Jeune Afrique, 2009). In other words, Chinese investment assigned 
for South Africa (as for any other country whether African or not) may conceal 
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investments earmarked for third countries in Africa that our statistics can hardly 
reveal. The evidence of these financial efforts underlying such a partnership can 
best demonstrate the strategy which China's African policy rests upon, provided 
however, that the operations of the Sino-African consortium are still proclaimed 
as such. Without such proclamations, the nature of the investors might as much 
disclose a possible strategy of the Chinese government. 
4. CHINESE ENTERPRISES AND ODI 
Before attempting to assess the involvement in Africa of Chinese enter-
prises under central government direct supervision, some aspects regarding the 
status and role in ODI by Chinese enterprises – irrespective of their regulator – 
should be clarified.  
4.1. The categories of Chinese enterprises and ODI 
The legal status of an enterprise and its regulator are characteristics of the 
investment it can undertake outside China. Also note that alongside the publicly 
funded enterprises, there are corporations (limited liability companies, share-
holding corporations) whose capital may be fully or partially (majority or mi-
nority holding) publicly funded.9 No statistics on ODI allow an accurate evalua-
tion of the weight of public funds in the investment decisions of these compa-
nies. There are also “private enterprises”; under this name are grouped small 
sole proprietorships and partnerships. To these categories is added the category 
of “foreign-funded enterprises” in which I will include companies known as 
“enterprises with funds from Hong Kong Chinese, Macao and Taiwan” whose 
funds strictly speaking come from outside China mainland. There are also whol-
ly Chinese-funded joint ventures and cooperative enterprises that are catego-
rized as “other enterprises” in Table 2. 
Table 2. Enterprises by status (non-financial ODI – 2010) 
 
         Source: Communiqué 2010, p. 18, 29.  
        * Such companies might be fully, partially or not at all publicly funded. 
                                                     
9
 Regulatory provisions issued by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1998 and amended in 2005 
make a clear-cut distinction between enterprises in the public economic sector (gongyou jingji) 
and those in the non-public economic sector (fei gongyou jingji). The latter should not be treated 
as private stricto sensu because a company belonging to one of these two sectors is determined by 
whether the majority (i.e. over 50%) of its original capital originated from public or non-public 
sources (www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz /t20061123_402369838.htm). 
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Table 2 shows the role of enterprises according to their category. As Chi-
nese enterprises are gradually investing abroad, the number of SOEs strictly 
speaking relative to other companies has declined significantly from 43% in 
2003 to 10% of investment operations registered in 2010. At the same time, the 
proportion of incorporated enterprises rose from 33% to 69% of investment 
operations. Given the presence of public funds in the capital of these enterpris-
es, this dynamic demonstrates, in a way, the success of the reform policy toward 
China’s old state production units rather than the changing nature of the Chi-
nese economy. Despite all of these changes, it is clear that 66.2% of the stock 
value of Chinese ODI is always a matter of SOEs whose autonomy from their 
regulator remains inevitably smaller than that of the (publicly or non-publicly 
funded) corporations which make up only 30.8% of this stock. 
4.2. The case of central enterprises 
The above categorisation suggests that there is still a place for publicly 
funded enterprises in the Chinese economy; however it tells us little about the 
role of these enterprises as agents of the Chinese government in its “conquest” 
of foreign markets. Available data demonstrate another distinction between 
enterprises supervised by the central government and those managed by a pro-
vincial government. This differentiation leads to contrast companies registering 
directly with MOFCOM with those doing so through the provincial bureau of 
MOFCOM. Formally, the “central enterprises” (zhongyang qiye or for short 
yang qi) are publicly-funded enterprises expressly designated in a list published 
by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission or SA-
SAC (Yangqi minglu, 2012). Late 2011, their number stands at 117 after being 
196 in 2003 when the SASAC was established. This evolution is the result of a 
series of strategic mergers. Central enterprises are the direct descendants of 
former industrial complex under branch-type agencies emulating the Soviet 
administration of the economy. Today they are groups having legal personality 
(jituan gongsi); their activity is now more sector-oriented – that is to say having 
a core business but at the same time carrying on a wide range of activities. They 
can hold shares in other groups, SOEs and companies whose capital is wholly 
or partly (Chinese or foreign) publicly funded.  
Table 3. Non-financial ODI (stock in %) 
 
         Source: Communiqués (2003-2010). 
Thus, in 2009, 129 central enterprises were controlling 19,684 subsidiar-
ies of which 3,906 were first-tier subsidiaries, 10,300 second-tier and 5,478 
third-tier... (SASAC, 2010:57). The ODI stock built up by these central enter-
prises themselves or through all their subsidiaries amounts to 80% of Chinese 
ODI on average between 2003 and 2010 as disclosed in Table 3. Over the eight 
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years for which we have figures in 2012, there was a slight decrease in the fi-
nancing of Chinese ODI by central enterprises but the main feature is the highly 
dominant role of these central enterprises. This finding raises the question of 
central enterprises actual autonomy when they decide to invest abroad.  
In a readily anti-statist ideological climate, the mere thought that a com-
pany might be wholly or partly funded by a state creates fears of malignant 
interference and feeds paranoid fantasies. Just remember when, in 2005, a 
CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) subsidiary in Hong Kong 
offered to purchase Unocal, it sparked off the anger of the U.S. Senators and 
Representatives – even though the Chinese government would have been rather 
unfavourable to such an acquisition. In fact, the takeover bid by CNOOC would 
have had little to do with the security of U.S. energy supplies but would have 
been much more directly related to the willingness of the Chinese company to 
acquire the means necessary to compete with other multinational firms and 
therefore to participate equally in major projects (Dorn, 2005:2). This demon-
stration of autonomy – inappropriate according to some people (Chinese or 
Americans) – is not exceptional. Erica Downs cites as evidence, among other 
things, that while Sudan was not included in the list of countries where the Chi-
nese government encourages Chinese enterprises to invest, CNPC (China Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation) did not stop investing there (Downs, 2007:50-
51). Nevertheless, the visit planned in September 2005 by Hu Jintao to Wash-
ington was delayed by the U.S. Congress in response to what was considered a 
breach in United States security – both parties hiding behind the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in an attempt to camouflage their sulking. It is best stated by 
Ronald McKinnon who suggests a reason why there could be a government 
strategy clearly established: In the context of a continuously depreciating dollar, 
a lack of maturity of Chinese financial institutions and a large disconnection of 
the Chinese economy relative to the rest of the world, the only recourse of the 
Chinese government to manage a glut of dollars would be to encourage “state-
owned enterprises to invest in, or partner with, foreign companies” and to foster 
“quasi-barter aid programs in developing countries which generate a return flow 
of industrial materials” (McKinnon, 2010).  
Without necessarily ruling out the central enterprises’ strategic priorities 
– either macroeconomic or political – as determinants of operational choices, 
there are, at the same time, perfectly objective reasons to minimise the alleged 
influence of the Chinese government. When acting within China, the state ad-
ministration can expect to exercise macro-control on central enterprises; how-
ever, the state administration is much more powerless when its purpose is to 
implement a micro-control. It would be the inadequacy of current audit proce-
dures that would prohibit any effective control of central enterprises’ manage-
ment, which, moreover, is frequently made opaque by insider control. This 
monitoring is even more difficult when these central enterprises operate abroad; 
relocation of decision centres strengthens the autonomy conquered by their 
overseas subsidiaries – not to mention the deprivation of any supervision oppor-
tunity when these subsidiaries are listed outside China. Seventy-one subsidiaries 
and central enterprises were listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, i.e. 9% of 
274 Thierry Pairault 
the capitalization of the exchange in 2008 (SASAC, 2009:55-56). In this situa-
tion, foreign investments may also be an opportunity to misappropriate assets. 
Chinese authors jot down a few wailing (Chen, 2009a; Li et al., 2010):  A frenzy of foreign investment leading to irrational decisions;  An outdated management style, a short-term view, an inability to cope with 
the outside world (lack of knowledge of foreign markets, of the law of for-
eign countries...);  Capital transfers not to be invested but to be loaned to foreign legal entity 
when not to individuals;  The ordinary use of straw men to register companies...  
In such circumstances it is likely that central enterprises’ activity could 
not be the mere reflection of “highly coordinated government strategies” as 
Erica Downs shows (2007:48-50). Alongside such centrifugal forces promoting 
the empowerment of central enterprises, it is equally clear that intervening polit-
ical factors may outweigh all other considerations as shown by the environmen-
tal and financial discord which reigned between two subsidiaries (Air China and 
China Eastern) held by two different central enterprises (Naughton, 2008:1-9). 
Similarly SASAC missions reveal the ambiguity of its position that sways be-
tween the empowerment of its companies and the consolidation of its own con-
trol: SASAC is responsible for introducing more “market” in the management 
(sichanghua) of central enterprises. Simultaneously SASAC must strengthen 
the role of the Party (jian dang)10. Some figures: in 2009, there were 78 million 
active members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or 2.3% of the Chinese 
population (RMRB, 2008:4). The same year in the central enterprises, there 
were 4.4 million people (including one quarter aged under 35) registered to 
CCP out of 17.1 million employees at all levels, i.e. almost one quarter of em-
ployees (SASAC, 2010:109 and 769). Moreover, as the appointment of central 
enterprises top managers comes under the authority of the CCP Politburo11, it is 
unlikely that their strategies differed fundamentally from those set by the cen-
tral government even if ways and means implemented can deviate by the shape 
and sometimes by the objectives. The central enterprises constitute neither an 
army of disciplined soldiers under and unified and conquering command, nor a 
stampede of soldiers left to themselves and going about to plunder the Third 
World. 
Assuming consistency – in the absence of a proven coordination – be-
tween the Chinese government's policies and activities undertaken by central 
enterprises and considering that they have taken over 80% of Chinese ODI (see 
above), I will continue my comments by confining the analysis to projects reg-
istered by the central enterprises and its subsidiaries that are identified in the 
                                                     
10
 SASAC yearbooks aim at showing how SASAC is carrying out its dual mandate as well as it 
organised rallies to enhance the image of leaders who swore allegiance to the Party (see for 
example, SASAC 2009: 95). 
11
 To illustrate the pervasiveness of the CCP in the industry, read the article by John Garnaut in 
the Sydney Morning Herald of 14 September 2010, www.smh.com.au/business/the-hidden-
hierarchy-in-chinas-industries -20100913-159bz.html. 
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MOFCOM on-line database and try to characterise a Chinese investment strate-
gy in Africa during the recent period (2003-2012). 
5. CENTRAL ENTERPRISES AND THEIR AFRICAN PROJECTS 
The MOFCOM on-line database lists 1,660 central enterprises’ invest-
ment projects out of 21,254 projects registered between January 2003 and April 
2012. In this section I will analyse the information related to these projects. 
5.1. The destination of central enterprises investment 
Before illustrating the destination of central enterprises’ investment pro-
jects, a general feature of Chinese ODI should be noted: there is a clear lack of 
proportionality between the number of projects and the total value of these pro-
jects aimed at a particular region. Thus, 31.4% (6,663) of projects identified 
from January 2003 to April 2012 are investments in financial, judicial, and 
banking havens, (see Table 4) but the value of these investments represents 
more than 80% of the total stock of ODI in late 2010 (see above Table 1). Con-
versely 68.6% of projects registered during the same period and whose destina-
tion is not some tax haven, mobilise less than 20% of the total stock of ODI in 
late 2010.  In other words, our ignorance of the fate of capital that is invested in 
tax havens obscure considerably our understanding of the role that Chinese ODI 
actually plays in the World economy as well as in China’s economy.  
Table 4. 21 254 ODI projects (January 2003-April 2012) 
 
                  Source: MOFCOM on-line database (author’s calculations). 
Even more important is that central enterprises’ investment behaviour is 
quite different from that of local enterprises during the period 2003-2012 (see 
Table 4). Both have the same Asian tropism even if it is more substantial for 
local enterprises (35.3% versus 25.6% for central enterprises). However for 
central enterprises, it is Africa which is the first destination ahead of Asia and 
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Middle East (respectively 30.6%, 25.6% and 12.1%). As for local enterprises, 
the three top destinations by the number of investment projects are Asia 
(35.3%), North America (18.5%) and European Union (12.6%). This regional 
specialisation obviously results from their originally assigned tasks; central 
enterprises have grown out from former industrial complex under branch-type 
agencies (see above) which first and foremost had to ensure China’s supply of 
raw materials. Conversely local enterprises – whether publicly funded or not – 
seek, not to produce or buy inputs for domestic production in China, but to sell 
manufactured goods to markets outside China. This is why local enterprises 
seem to favour the more developed countries of Asia, Europe and North Ameri-
ca (market-seeking investment) in contrast to central enterprises (resource-
seeking investment). 
To better illustrate central enterprises’ tropism and thus specify their in-
terest in Africa, I shall classify projects according to the level of development of 
the benefiting economies and shall oppose “developed economies” to “develop-
ing economies” with the latter category also including “transition economies” as 
defined by UNCTAD (2011:xi-xiv). The result is quite obvious (see Table 5): 
on the average central enterprises tend to invest preferably in developing econ-
omies (80.2% of registered projects from January 2003 to April 2012 excluding 
tax haven countries). This amounts to a much greater proportion than the aver-
age proportion of the projects in the database for the same period (61.8%). In 
other words, if the African strategy of central enterprises – which are responsi-
ble for 80% of Chinese ODI and for more than 80% of China’s investment pro-
jects abroad – reflected the Chinese government strategy, it would prove itself 
through the sectoral composition of projects implemented in developing econ-
omies. 
Table 5. Projects by destination (January 2003-April 2012) 
 
             Source: MOFCOM on-line database (author’s calculations). 
5.2. The sectoral composition of Chinese ODI in Africa 
The MOFCOM annual communiqués give an insight into the sectoral 
structure of China’s ODI as a whole but give very limited information on the 
ODI sectoral structure for each recipient. Some indications were given by the 
CAITEC (Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation 
under the MOFCOM) which issued on 8 July 2010 data on the sectoral distribu-
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tion of Chinese investment in Africa.12 CAITEC figures might be somewhat 
questionable for the descriptions of investment projects are often imprecise. It is 
not clear whether these figures are computed according to the sector in which 
the investor is classified in its home country (China) or according to the classi-
fication of the activity for which its investment is intended. Thus in the case of 
the In Salah-Tamanrasset project in Algeria, Sinopec was chosen neither to 
explore oilfields nor to extract oil but to build an aqueduct! Whatever that it 
might be, differences between the two graphs (see Figure 5) are striking and 
show two investment behaviours. The main concern of Chinese firms when 
investing in Africa might be to invest in the mining sector and to implement 
barter deals in which infrastructure construction are exchanged for raw materi-
als. This in turn suggests that investment in the mining sector as well as invest-
ment in infrastructure both – directly and indirectly – contribute to secure Chi-
na’s supply of raw materials. In this respect, it would mean that the stock of 
resource-securing ODI amounts to 55% of the Chinese total ODI in Africa 
when it only amounts to 25% of the Chinese total ODI in the World. Converse-
ly, it would mean that the stock of market-developing ODI only amounts to 9% 
of the Chinese total ODI in Africa when it amounts to 63% of the Chinese total 
ODI in the World. 
Figure 5. Sectoral structure of China’s ODI  
(stock in 2009 excluding financial sector) 
China’s ODI in Africa China’s ODI in the World 
 
             Sources: MOFCOM, CAITEC and author’s calculation. 
5.3. The sectoral composition of central enterprises projects 
The figures stated above do not discriminate between investment under-
taken by enterprises whether they are under central supervision or local supervi-
sion. In this concern, MOFCOM on-line list of enterprises having registered 
investment projects might be of some help. Searching this database suggest that 
                                                     
12
 The original page on CAITEC website (www.caitec.org.cn/c/cn/news/2010-07/08/news_ 
2148.html) is apparently no longer available but the data can however be found at 
pairault.fr/sinaf/index.php/statistiques/192-investissement-sectoriel-chinois-en-2008-et-2009. 
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CAITEC figures might be somewhat questionable for the descriptions of in-
vestment projects are often imprecise. Given the elusiveness with which these 
projects are usually recorded, sectoral data are at most indicative since they 
cannot be cross-referenced either with recipient countries statistics, or with in-
vestors’ sectoral origin. Therefore it could be illusory to draft a classification of 
central enterprises that follows a standard classification of activities such as the 
United Nations nomenclature ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion of All Economic Activities). Since 2002 China has its own classification 
(GB/T4754-2002) that has some notable differences from the standard ISIC but 
it is of little consequence here.13 Thus, I shall attempt to analyse central enter-
prises’ investment projects by asking a simple question: does their investment 
primarily aim at developing abroad central enterprises’ market or does they 
mainly aim at ensuring China’s supply of raw materials in the short or medium 
term? One activity cannot answer this question: transportation that serves in-
vestment in both contexts. After classifying in this way the central enterprises’ 
investment projects in Africa which are registered by MOFCOM between Janu-
ary 2003 and April 2012, the opposition that we already established above be-
tween “resource-securing ODI” and “market-developing ODI” seems even 
more relevant for assessing the existence of a the strategy implemented by cen-
tral enterprises in Africa (Table 6). 
Table 6. Central enterprises‘ investment projects 
(January 2003 – April 2012) 
 
             Source: MOFCOM on-line database, author’s calculation. 
Central enterprises’ investment projects in Africa add up to 38.2% of 
their investment projects in developing economies between January 2003 et 
April 2012, that is to say almost twice the figure for local enterprises (20.3%) 
whose investment projects in developing Asia amount to 51.0% versus 29.2% 
for central enterprises. Whatever the relative number of central enterprises’ 
investment projects in Africa, their part is obviously similar to that in other 
developing economies as a whole but with an exaggeration of its specific fea-
ture: the share of resource-securing ODI amounts to 68.5% against 65.3% on 
average for developing economies taken as a whole. What emerges from the 
sectoral structure of central enterprises’ investment projects is obviously the 
place of Africa in the international division of labour: Africa has the role of a 
supplier of raw material or slightly processed materials at the service of the 
“workshop of the world”. However, the part played by Africa as a continent 
                                                     
13
 See www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz/index.htm, www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz/hyflbz/xgwj/t20030613_40215 
4085.htm and www.oecd.org /dataoecd/32/24/33982319.pdf. 
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might conceal the more specific part played by each country if considered indi-
vidually. Chinese resource-securing investment projects amount to 93% in D.R. 
Congo, 71% in Angola and Ethiopia, 65% in Zambia… whereas they only reach 
38% in Madagascar, 40% in Benin, 41% in South Africa.  
6. CHINA IN AFRICA: AN INVESTOR AS ANOTHER? 
What do we learn from exploring various information sources and data-
bases on China's direct investment in Africa?  
The availability of statistics: The distinctive features of the various na-
tional statistic systems and their inability to grasp the phenomenon of foreign 
direct investment prohibit any shrewd statistical analysis of flows and stocks 
FDI in value. In the Chinese case, besides apposite but still insufficient quanti-
tative data, qualitative data made available by MOFCOM, however, provide a 
valuable complementary approach since they allow us more than somewhat to 
refine the statistical figures. These qualitative data also suggest that case studies 
are needed to understand the relationship that China may have with each Afri-
can country that is benefiting from its investments. 
Chinese direct investment in Africa: The exact amount and the actual des-
tinations of the Chinese ODI are exceedingly difficult to identify – a fortiori 
when they are allotted to African countries whose statistical systems are very 
often less developed than the Chinese one. In this respect, it does matter that the 
much disparaged Chinese bureaucracy laid down systematic registration of in-
vestment projects abroad. However, available figures suggest that, despite a 
remarkable growth since 2003, Chinese ODI still occupy a relatively modest 
place given the importance of China’s economy and population: in 2010, it 
ranks 18th in ODI stock but 80th in ODI stock per capita according to UNCTAD 
statistics which includes investment to tax haven destinations. The stock of 
Chinese investment in Africa, meanwhile, represented only 0.06% of world 
ODI stock. The weakness of the figure should not lead us to conclude too hasti-
ly “much ado about nothing”; however it should push us to reconsider the para-
noia of some commentators exclaiming, like Andrew Malone on 18 July 2008 
in the Daily Mail, “An astonishing invasion of Africa is now under way.”14  
The role of central enterprises: Despite the increasing involvement of 
privately-funded enterprises, the role of publicly-funded enterprises is critical 
because about 80% of ODI is the very fact of enterprises under the direct super-
vision of central government. Nevertheless it is unlikely that these central en-
terprises would act in Africa as mere agents of the Chinese government and 
would have no autonomy of their own.  
Highly targeted direct investment: Whatever their current effective au-
tonomy – either snatched or granted –, central enterprises draw their overseas 
                                                     
14
 Andrew Malone denounced slavery, colonialism together with a secret undermining of institu-
tions led by the Chinese in Africa (www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1036105/How-Chinas-
taking-Africa-West-VERY-worried.html#ixzz0NnatMffg). 
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investments legitimacy from their very origin. So it comes as no surprise that 
some are forcefully devoting themself to the supply of raw materials for China's 
economy, while others dedicate themselves actively to the selling of their do-
mestic production on foreign markets. Also it is not surprising that their sectoral 
choices will always coincide with their comparative advantages just as well 
their investment destinations, hence their presence in Africa. 
Chinese government strategy: It would be inconsistent either to deny the 
existence of a Chinese government strategy or to see in such a strategy the ex-
pression of a malignant progressive subjugation of the planet that would start 
with Africa. Actually, the choices made by central enterprises when investing in 
Africa suggest a behaviour that is not significantly different from that of their 
competitors worldwide. For example, major international oil companies operat-
ing in Angola include BP, Chevron, Total, ExxonMobil, Eni, Petrobras and 
Statoil as well as SINOPEC and CNOOC – i.e. two Chinese central enterprises 
out of the three Chinese national oil companies which are under the direct su-
pervision of the Chinese government (the fourth one being the Shaanxi Yan-
chang Petroleum Group, a publicly funded enterprise under provincial supervi-
sion) …  
We must note that the general trend is that China reproduces the behav-
iour of investors that came before it in Africa. In short, beyond its own idiosyn-
crasies, China does nothing that the rest of the world has not already done or 
would not do in its place. Beyond any doubt, that is actually the major issue! 
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LES INVESTISSEMENTS DIRECTS CHINOIS EN AFRIQUE :      
UNE STRATÉGIE D’ÉTAT ? 
 
Résumé - L’objet de cette contribution est d’examiner les bases de données statistiques et informationnelles disponibles pour apprécier l’importance réelle 
de l’investissement direct chinois en Afrique et d’en comprendre la portée stra-
tégique. Les trois principales sources d’information et de statistiques sont suc-
cessivement présentées, puis les observations qu’elles permettent. Le rôle de ces 
investissements en Afrique et la question de la stratégie des entreprises sous 
tutelle direct du gouvernement central sont alors discutés. 
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